Title: On Multicriteria Games with Uncountable Sets of Equilibria
Abstract:The famous Harsanyi's (1973) Theorem states that generically a finite game has an odd number of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. In this paper, we show that for finite multicriteria games (games w...The famous Harsanyi's (1973) Theorem states that generically a finite game has an odd number of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. In this paper, we show that for finite multicriteria games (games with vector-valued payoffs) this kind of result does not hold. In particular, we show, by examples, that it is possible to find balls in the space of games such that every game in this set has uncountably many equilibria so that uncountable sets of equilibria are not nongeneric in multicriteria games. Moreover, we point out that, surprisingly, all the equilibria of the games cor- responding to the center of these balls are essential, that is, they are stable with respect to every possible perturbation on the data of the game. However, if we consider the scalarization stable equilibrium concept (introduced in De Marco and Morgan (2007) and which is based on the scalarization technique for multicriteria games), then we show that it provides an effective selection device for the equilibria of the games corresponding to the centers of the balls. This means that the scalarization stable equilibrium concept can provide a sharper selection device with respect to the other classical refinement concepts in multicriteria games.Read More
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-12-18
Language: en
Type: preprint
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