Title: Legislative Heart and Phase Transitions: An Exploratory Study of Congress and Minority Interests
Abstract: TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: DOES RACE MATTER? II. LEGISLATIVE HEART AND REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY INTERESTS A. Direct Versus Representative Legislative Voice B. Members' Policy Responsiveness: Existing Studies C. Legislative Heart as a Measure of Legislative Voice 1. The Quantitative/Qualitative Research Debate 2. Chaos Theory's Contribution 3. A New Approach to the Study of Legislative Voice III. AN EXPLORATORY STUDY: CONGRESS AND FAIR LENDING A. The Congress: Policy Responsiveness of the Majority 1. Actions Taken 2. The Legislative Details 3. Actions Refused 4. The Reasons Given and Perceived a. The Initial Enactment: 1968 b. The First Period of Turbulence: 1974-1977 c. The Second Period of Turbulence: 1988-1991 5. Feedback and the Legislative Environment B. Individual Members: Comparative Policy Responsiveness of White and Minority Members 1. Proposals for Action 2. Advocacy Efforts in Committee and on the Floor a. The Initial Enactment: 1968 b. The First Period of Turbulence: 1974-1977 c. The Second Period of Turbulence: 1988-1991 3. Voting Records Generally C. Phase Transitions: Nonlinearity and Critical Mass 1. Critical Mass: Committee Viewpoint 2. Critical Mass: Individual Advocacy IV. CONCLUSION APPENDIX: VOTING RECORD RATINGS OF HOUSE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS I. INTRODUCTION: DOES RACE MATTER? Racial gerrymandering . . . threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.(1) The goal of racial blindness convinced Justice O'Connor and a majority of the United States Supreme Court to subject race-based congressional reapportionment schemes to strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.(2) Such an analysis caused the Court to invalidate, most recently in 1996,(3) certain congressional districts created to ensure that minority voters held a majority position in those districts--so called districts. Despite the Court's lofty goals, however, the question remains whether race continues to matter in the political process. The answer to this question should influence the Court's view of the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause as well as the manner in which it may be applied in political districting decisions. This Article does not focus on election results. It focuses, instead, on the issue of representation of minority interests in the Congress--representation that takes the form of policy responsiveness. Only a decade ago, an opinion of the United States Supreme Court led to legislative redistricting aimed at maximizing the number of elected officials from minority groups.(4) Subsequent Congresses reflected the results of this redistricting. After the 1992 election, the number of black members of the House of Representatives rose to thirty-nine, from only seventeen in 1981.(5) District maps drawn specifically to elect additional minority members made it possible for thirteen new blacks and six new Hispanics to win election to the House in 1992.(6) Thirty-six of the thirty-nine black members elected in 1992 were elected from majority-minority districts, whereas only three were elected from majority-white districts.(7) A decade after the Thornburg decision, however, the Court views race-based districting differently.(8) Yet the Court's view of the equal protection challenge still is evolving.(9) This Article addresses that evolution. Depending in part on future federal and state court equal protection decisions, gains achieved through race-based redistricting may be eliminated. …
Publication Year: 1997
Publication Date: 1997-07-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 5
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