Title: The grants economy and collective consumption: Proceedings of a conference held by the international economic association at Cambridge, England
Abstract: Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.
Publication Year: 1984
Publication Date: 1984-06-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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