Title: Monotonicity in games that Exhaust Gains to Scale
Abstract:We compare core payoffs in two cooperative games in which coalitions contained in both player sets have the same feasible payoffs in both games. The players are characterized by their “types, and play...We compare core payoffs in two cooperative games in which coalitions contained in both player sets have the same feasible payoffs in both games. The players are characterized by their “types, and players of the same type are substitutes for each other. If the (finite) set of players in each game is large enough to exhaust gains to scale in a sense we define, the abindance of one type of player and the core utility achieved by that type cannot change in the same direction. If the core utility is interpreted as the price of the player, the interpretation is that price decreases with supply. We present a geometric exposition and extend our results to games derived from exchange economics. Suzanne Scotchmer National Fellow Hoover Institution (415) 723-9175 and University of California, Berkeley Myrna Holtz Wooders University of TorontoRead More
Publication Year: 1988
Publication Date: 1988-01-01
Language: en
Type: preprint
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Cited By Count: 17
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