Title: Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence
Abstract: Part 1 Motives for monetary expansion under perfect information: overview the employment motive for monetary expansion the revenue motive for monetary expansion the mercantile or balance-of-payments motive for monetary expansion comparison of policy outcomes under a system of adjustable pegs with outcomes under a commonly managed currency system and its consequences for European monetary unification the financial stability motive, interest rate smoothing, and the theory of optimal seigniorage. Part 2 Asymmetric information and changing objectives under discretion: overview of models of monetary policy with private information the employment motive in the presence of a minimal information advantage about objectives an extended information advantage about central bank objectives alternative notions of credibility and reputation the politically optimal level of ambiguity. Part 3 Velocity shocks, politics, signalling, inflation persistence, and accommodation: private information about money demand and credibility partial disclosure of policy and its effect on policy outcomes why does inflation persist? - theories of monetary accommodation and of inflation cyclicality under discretion signalling and private information about the ability to commit and about objectives with time-invariant types political parties and monetary policy. Part 4 Central bank independence and policy outcomes - theory and evidence: aspects of central bank independence and their impact on policy outcomes and the distribution of inflation the measurement of central bank independence inflation and central bank independence ranking of central banks by an overall index of inflation-based central bank independence the mean and the variance of inflation, central bank credit, and central bank independence the determinants of central bank independence.
Publication Year: 1992
Publication Date: 1992-11-13
Language: en
Type: book
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Cited By Count: 1454
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