Title: Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers
Abstract:This paper investigates second-best (transfers in kind) and third-best (subsidies and taxes) Pare to optima in a simple model were government lacks full information ab out consumer types (who is able,...This paper investigates second-best (transfers in kind) and third-best (subsidies and taxes) Pare to optima in a simple model were government lacks full information ab out consumer types (who is able, who is infirm). These Pareto optima rely on self-selection. The authors show that those second-best Paret o optima which are not also first-best (some do exist) can only be su pported by rationing. They also show that every third-best optimum, o ther than the equal-income Walrasian equilibrium, is Pareto-dominated by some second-best optimum. In addition, standard willingness-to- pay cost-benefit tests are inappropriate in this environment. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.Read More
Publication Year: 1988
Publication Date: 1988-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 295
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