Abstract: The paper explores several of the ways in which economic elites can threaten the implementation of the democratic ideal through the disproportionate power they are often permitted to exercise in the political domain. They can lend their support to efforts to restrict the franchise (for example, by pruning voting lists under cover of a drive to prevent electoral fraud). They can bankroll the campaigns of candidates for electoral office in ways that undermine their ability to make independent political decisions. They can pay lobbyists to do their bidding in the corridors of power, by prevailing upon legislators to protect their private interests at the expense of the public interest. And they can use the clout they have with influential members of the political class to maintain features of the electoral system that generally shield them from the effective mobilization of anti-elitist political sentiment: for example, they can throw their weight behind the practice of gerrymandering in the drawing of electoral district boundaries, and they can help to fend off periodic demands for reform of the electoral system through abandonment of “first-past-the-post” rules for victory in electoral contests.
Publication Year: 2013
Publication Date: 2013-10-31
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot