Abstract: HIRSCHL, Ran. Constitutional Theocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. 306pp. Cloth, $46.50--Ran Hirschl's work addresses a question of fundamental importance for the contemporary world, the relationship between principles of the rule of law and the order on one hand, and religiously informed communities on the other. The book attempts to show how advocates of law and courts have emerged in many countries with established religions, serving as bastions of relative secularism in order to hedge or mitigate the influence of religiosity in the political order. Hirschl argues that the constitutionalizing of religion is itself an important step in asserting control over religious influences, allowing the law to restrict what is seen as the potentially dangerous excesses of religion. Hirschl commences with an overview of the rise of what he calls constitutional theocracy in the modern world. He defines theocracies as states that possess a clear arrangement, a religion formally endorsed by the state, and the enshrining of the religion as the main source of legislation for the state, as well as a set of religious bodies that function as important--if unofficial--transmitters of the customs and interests of the established religion. Iran is identified as perhaps the quintessential model of the strong form of theocracy. Chapter two provides a taxonomy of the multiple forms of orders in terms of how they might reject, accommodate, or incorporate religion. Hirschl recognizes especially the way in which some modern states have dealt with the question of religious identity. The 1937 Turkish constitution, for example, explicitly incorporated the term secular to describe the state (Hirschl also says atheist, but no support is given for the claim), and Saudi Arabia, among others, has willingly suspended Shari'a principles from being applied universally, so as to accommodate modern economic practices or the tourist industry. The various reasons why law came to the forefront in the West, over against the claims of religious law, are analyzed in chapter three. That turn he attributes to multiple and sometimes opposing factors, including the attempt to distance religious authority from political responsibility, the desire to coopt sources of religious authority, and the view that courts are more reliable protectors of autonomous individual rights. Chapter four contains what might be described as the heart of the argument of the book, as Hirschl here lays out the manner in which the promotion and practice of law regularly constrains impulses in nations with large religious majorities. He treats Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, Israel, and Turkey at length, showing how the courts have routinely exercised control over the attempts by religious entities to subject the law to their theocratic interests. …
Publication Year: 2013
Publication Date: 2013-12-01
Language: en
Type: article
Access and Citation
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot