Title: Redistributive Conflicts and Preferences for Tax Schemes in Europe
Abstract: Meltzer and Richard (1981) state that democracy will boost redistribution of income from
the rich to the poor. Given that the median-income voter is poorer than the average-income
voter, a majority of voters will vote for redistribution. Although the assertion of a positive
relationship between democracy and equalization of income has been highly criticized on
both theoretical and empirical grounds, most empirical studies have focused on responses
to the conventional question about whether the government should reduce income
differences. In this paper we propose a different specification of the Meltzer and Richard
hypothesis in which individuals do not have to vote for a general tax rate, but for taxes for
particular groups. To test this theoretical model empirically, we use data about preferences
for taxation taken from the ISSP (Role of Government), in which individuals must express
their agreement with the taxes paid by different income groups. We propose a measure of
targeted redistribution through taxation at the individual level that is used as the dependent
variable in further analyses. Several hypotheses about preferences for tax schemes are
tested. At the individual level, we test whether preferences are explained by self-interest
variables such as socio-economic status and labor market situation. At the aggregate level,
we test whether preferences for tax schemes are related to inequality and tax burden by
country. To analyze these issues, we use a multilevel methodology. Empirical evidence
shows that preferences for tax schemes are mainly driven by self-interest, although there
are important differences by countries.
Publication Year: 2010
Publication Date: 2010-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 2
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