Title: Who was the First One? The Subject and Method of a History of Human Rights
Abstract: The article points out the fact that histories of human rights are often based on a kind of circular logic because they seek to find predecessors to a contemporary conception of human rights. However, this approach compels us to ignore a wide range of theories which operated with the notion of human rights in the past. In conclusion what we look for in history is only a confirmation of our present beliefs. This approach prevents us from seeing that human rights were used for various purposes and that their meaning may not be inferred from a static definition, as proposed in the Vienna Declaration of 1993, but from the argumentative purpose for which they are used in communication. If we continue to believe that human rights are Platonic ideas which are absolutely good, and the use of which may not be a subject of systematic scrutiny, we easily become victims of anyone who uses human rights as an argument.In order to question contemporary beliefs in the self-sufficient power of the notion of human rights, I focus on the moment when a fully-fledged theory of human rights appeared for the first time in history. My intention is to show from the example of the first legal theories of human rights that the meaning of this term changes according to the context and that it is not guaranteed by an exact definition, or by using the exact wording "human rights". In order to show this, our article follows the emergence of the idea of human rights in early legal and philosophical theories. We start with the emergence of the exact wording "human rights" in Spanish theology of the 16th century and gradually add the notion of inalienable goods in Grotius, and proceed to the application of "natural rights" in natural law and social contract theories of the 17th century. The case of Spinoza's use of rights and democracy even shows that the meaning of such key terms can be changed quite dramatically. Even though none of the early modern lawyers we have discussed proposed that justice should be guaranteed by a bill of human rights, I point out that early modern lawyers sought to guarantee justice by providing a well-thought-out system of laws that would be based on simple and absolutely true principles of justice.