Title: The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the private and social value of information along with the reward of inventive activity. The individual is always fully acquainted with the supply–demand offers of all potential traders, and an equilibrium integrating all individuals' supply-demand offers is attained instantaneously. Individuals are unsure only about the size of their own commodity endowments and/or about the returns attainable from their own productive investments. They are subject to technological uncertainty rather than market uncertainty. The main reason is that information, viewed as a product, is only imperfectly appropriable by its discoverer. The standard literature on the economics of research and invention argues that there tends to be private underinvestment in inventive activity mainly because of the imperfect appropriability of knowledge. The contention made is that even with a patent system, the inventor can only hope to capture some fraction of the technological benefits because of his discovery. Even though practical considerations limit the effective scale and consequent impact of speculation and/or resale, the gains thus achievable eliminate any a priori anticipation of underinvestment in the generation of new technological knowledge.
Publication Year: 1971
Publication Date: 1971-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 1436
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