Abstract: Nash equilibrium leaves the impression that each player foresees perfectly and responds optimally. Must human-like, rational agents really acquire both these faculties? This paper argues that in some instances neither is ever needed. For the argument repeated play is modelled here as a constrained, decentralized, second-order process driven by noncoordinated pursuit of better payoffs. Some friction feeds into — and stabilizes — a fairly myopic mode of behavior. Convergence to equilibrium therefore obtains under weak and natural conditions. An important condition is that accumulation of marginal payoffs, along the path of play, yields a sum which is bounded above.
Publication Year: 2004
Publication Date: 2004-06-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 18
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