Title: Evolutionary escape from the prisoner's dilemma
Abstract: The classic prisoner's dilemma model of game theory is modified by introducing occasional variations on the options available to players. Mutation and selection of game options reliably change the game matrix, gradually, from a prisoner's dilemma game into a byproduct mutualism one, in which cooperation is stable, and "temptation to defect" is replaced by temptation to cooperate. This result suggests that when there are many different potential ways of interacting, exploring those possibilities may make escape from prisoner's dilemmas a common outcome in the world. A consequence is that persistent prisoner's dilemma structures may be less common than one might otherwise expect.
Publication Year: 2006
Publication Date: 2006-10-19
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref', 'pubmed']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 85
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