Title: Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result
Abstract: We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties. The main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort. We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs. In this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds. Our results imply a partial robustness result for the all-pay auction.
Publication Year: 2010
Publication Date: 2010-02-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 126
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